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ARBITRATIONS AND LABOR RELATIONS
CLARENCE M. UPDEGRAFFt
I. INTRODUCTION
Some of the early records of men indicate various primitive
methods of resolving disputes." Obviously, when law is undiffer-
entiated as an element of social control from superstition (re-
ligion) and social approval (or public opinion) no true judicial
system can exist. There is evidence that in many parts of the
world there were early appeals for divine intercession in the
pre-law period.2 These took the forms of trials by battle, trials
by ordeal and later, in a first groping for decision on a logical
basis, compurgationA In the next stage of social development,
lex, fas and boni mores begin to be differentiated. For some
time, the weakest of these is lex, or law. But in the legal sys-
tems which survive to maturity, it comes to dominate the ele-
ments of religion and public opinion as the ultimate factor in
social control. 4
As law develops, whether through recognition and enforce-
ment of custom as binding upon all parties, as theoretically
divinely ordained or as declared by authoritarian decree or stat-
ute, compulsory obedience to the courts emerges. Informal deci-
sion of all types of disputes by arbitrators, however, continues
until they are finally excluded from dealing with criminal ques-
tions when at length the penal laws are differentiated from the
civil. Later arbitration comes to be regarded as less desirable
in some ways and less effective than the more authoritative
court action, but it does not disappear. Some of the oldest law
books of our Anglo-American legal system contain occasional
t Professor of Law, University of Iowa School of Law.
1. Engelmann and Millar, History of Continental Civil Procedure (1927)
1, 6, 117, 259, 612, 787, 847 and numerous references therein; see also
"Judgment of Solomon," 1 Kings 3, 16-28; 1 Pollock & Maitland, History
of English Law (2d ed." 1923) xxvii-xxix, 4 (Bishops as arbitrators in the
4th century in purely secular disputes.)
2. Plucknett, A Concise History of the Common Law 108 et seq.
3. Plucknett, op. cit. supra note 2, at 109-110, 325, 379, 390, 565, 578;
Pound and Plucknett, Readings on the History, etc. of the Common Law
(3d ed. 1927) 134 et seq.
4. Pound, Law and Morals 27-31, 33; cf. Plucknett, op. cit. supra note
2, at 4-5.
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reference to "arbitrement."' It is obvious that moral questions
or obligations for which no legal rights are developed must con-
tinue to depend upon arbitrational procedure or be unenforced.
The fact is, however, that in all times even legal questions have
been frequently submitted to arbitration instead of to the courts.
In the time of Lord Coke, this practice was so common that that
great champion of the common law declared an agreement in
advance to submit a possible dispute to arbitration would be
non-binding upon the parties because against public policy as
tending to defeat or restrict the normal jurisdiction of the
courts.' This statement had a profound effect upon the subse-
quent course of arbitrational development and statute making.?
As already intimated, arbitrational procedure has always been
less formal than that which obtained in the courts of law and
equity. For this reason, many people have found it more desir-
able as a mode of trying a dispute. They feel that through this
informality they can more thoroughly get their thinking and
their interpretation of the important facts before the trier of
the issue, and that the decision itself, therefore, will reflect more
practical reality as they conceive it. These appeals to arbitra-
tion are in part a shrinking from formal court action and a
seeking for plain and informal justice, rather than that which
disputants fear the court will offer, i. e., austere, rigid, remote
and abstract decision.*
Please do not misunderstand me to state that I agree with
this appraisal of court action. I merely state it as a practical
and realistic factor or attitude, which constrains some people,
educated as well as uneducated, to turn instinctively toward
arbitration rather than adjudication for the solution of a dis-
pute.
Among the consequences of the informality and flexibility of
arbitrational procedure is that these characteristics permit the
submission of many and various types of disputes to the umpire
or arbitrational board. Technical legal questions (not involving
5. See Updegraff and McCoy, Arbitration of Labor Disputes (1946)
5 and authorities there cited. Cf. Keller, Der Romische Civilprocess und
die Actionen sec. 81.
6. Vynior's Case (1609) 4 Co. 81b, Trin. Term, 7 Jac. 1.
7. See Updegraff and McCoy, op. cit. supra note 5, at 42 et seq.8. See Carey, L. ., Arbitration, Its Place in Today's Disputes (1942)
5 U. of Detroit L. J. 180 et seq.; Wolaver, The Historical Background of
Commercial Arbitration (1934) 83 U. of Pa. L. Rev. 132-146.
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-criminal law) can be decided. The arbitrator may apply common
law principles and statutory rules. He may also decide for the
parties matters that have nothing to do with law, such as wage
increases, grants of paid vacations, paid holidays, health and
medical aid, retirement and pension plans, and similar matters.
The arbitrator can obviously conclude all types of routine griev-
zances which may arise under a contract. These may embrace
everything from the amount of an incentive rate to a demand
for employment during a work shortage on the basis of some
-theory of seniority. Even the grievance that demands reinstate-
-ment and back pay for a discharged employee, sometimes in-
volving questions of law as well as contractual rights, may be
decided by means of arbitration.9
II. SELECTION OF ARBITRATOR
Such early information as can be found upon the subject must
'be read to indicate that in early times the arbitrator was most
commonly selected by agreement of the parties. 0 To a large
•degree this remains true today. Certain changes and develop-
ments, however, have taken place. A few decades ago, an arbi-
trator was more likely than not to be one of supposed skill in
the trade, business or profession in which the dispute arose. At
the present time, however, the parties are more likely to search
for one who is skilled in interpreting evidence and weighing and
balancing it, rather than one having technically complete infor-
.mation in the field of the dispute. For example, very few arbi-
trators today can be said to be skilled tool and die makers, car-
penters, shoe craftsmen, or otherwise. Most arbitrators are
lawyers, while some economists and others are active in the
field. Whatever background of educational and experimental
qualifications is present, however, the parties now appear to
.select the party to make the decision on the basis of his capacity
to appreciate evidence and follow it to a sound solution, rather
than upon his previously established competence as a journey-
man or well-informed member of the business field in which the
9. For a great number of examples see any of the several currently
,published Labor Law Services, e. g., Commerce Clearing House, Bureau of
Nat'l Affairs, and Prentice-Hall.
10. See Vynior's Case (1609) 4 Co. 81b, Trin. Term, 7 Jac. 1 and cases
in Bracton's Note Book, S. 649 (1231), S. 732 (1233) and S. 983 (1244).
Cf. 1 Kings 3, 16 "Then there came two women, that were harlots, unto
.the king, and stood before him" etc.
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dispute exists. That the presently required qualifications are
proving to be generally satisfactory is attested by the fact that
even questions involving very technical problems of manufac-
turing are now commonly submitted to law trained men and
economists for final awards in the light of evidence and argu-
ments presented to them and intended to clarify in their minds
whatever technical knowledge of the subject may be necessary
to reach a sound decision.
Today, as formerly, many arbitrators are selected on an ad
hoc basis by mutual agreement of the parties after a dispute
has arisen. In numerous instances, the parties by contract have
agreed upon some appointing agency, such as the Federal Medi-
ation and Conciliation Service, the National Academy of Arbi-
trators, the American Arbitrational Association, a governor, a
judge or some other official. Probably the most rapidly growing
practice in recent years has been that of inserting the name of
a contract arbitrator or umpire into the annual agreement with
the matter established between the parties that such named man
shall be the umpire to settle all disputes between them during
the term of the agreement. 1
Whatever the means of selection, the parties are likely to be
seeking certain characteristics of the individual named to decide
the dispute. They ask for an impartial, judicial attitude, a quick-
ness of understanding and perception of the underlying as well
as the obvious features of the differences between the parties.
They hope for an attitude of the umpire which recognizes he
has a duty to society as well as a duty to the parties, and that
in the discharge of such duties, he will constantly aspire toward
the highest ideals of impartiality. The arbitrator must have no
dealings with either party which are unknown to the other. He
may expect fair compensation for his work, but should be quick
to serve without pay where the public welfare requires his ser-
vices.
III. CONTRACTS TO ARBITRATE AND SUBMISSION AGREEMENTS
As was previously intimated, the agreement to arbitrate a
possible future dispute not existing at the time such covenant
11. See, Arbitration Provisions in Union Agreements (1944) U. S. Dept.
Labor Bull., No. 780; cf. Hill and Hook, Management at the Bargainng
Table (1945) 73-87 (an employer's view); Labor Arbitration Under State
Statutes 2 et seq. (U. S. Dept. Labor 1943).
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is made, has on numerous occasions and in various places been
held to be against public policy. Such decisions, as above indi-
cated, follow the old English decision in Vynior's case.1 2 Vir-
tually all of the states in the Union have today some type or
types of arbitration statutes. Under most of these the agree-
ment to arbitrate future disputes is valid rather than invalid.
Such enactments have been held to be supplemental of the com-
mon law, rather than in derogation of it.13 Hence, if some for-
mality required by the statute is not complied with, the arbitra-
tion can proceed and its legality can be tested and probably sus-
tained under common law principles. This, however, does not
adequately explain the almost complete, tacit assumption to be
encountered throughout the United States today that the agree-
ment in an annual labor contract between a company and union
providing for arbitration as a final step in a grievance proce-
dure is entirely valid and binding upon the parties. Whether
technically this is legally correct or not in the state where the
parties are located, most companies and unions proceed regu-
larly and unhesitatingly as if it were. Usually this can be ex-
plained by the fact both parties prefer arbitration to strikes or
lockouts and hence are constrained to proceed in arbitration
whether they are technically bound to do so or not.
The submission agreement is a more technical contract than
the previously mentioned agreement to arbitrate. The "submis-
sion" recognizes the present existence of the dispute. It em-
bodies the formal and carefully phrased agreement of the parties
to submit a certain question to arbitration. 14 The feature of this
type of document is, in fact, the bargained statement of the
exact issue or dispute matters which the arbitrator is authorized
jointly by the parties to decide.
Some differences of opinion and practices exist pertaining to
the desirability or necessity of working out a formal submission
agreement where the parties have a provision for arbitration
as a final step of their grievance procedure. Obviously the latter
is a contract to arbitrate disputes to arise in the future. Such
12. (1609) 4 Co. 81b, Trin. Term, 7 Jac. 1.
13. Updegraff and McCoy, op. cit. supra note 5, at 6, 19, 87. See Isaac
v. Donegal and Conoy Mutual Fire Ins. Co. (1930) 301 Pa. 351, 152 Atl. 95.
14. E. g. In re Arbitration between Victor Klinger et al. and J. S. Krum,
Inc., (1940) 259 App. Div. 309, 19 N. Y. Supp. (2d) 193; Nutt v. U. S.(1887) 125 U. S. 650, 8 S. Ct. 997; Updegraff and McCoy, op. cit. supra
note 5, at 43.
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an agreement in several of our American jurisdictions will have
but doubtful validity, if any. However, the same factors which
cause the parties to enter the contract in the first place are likely
to constrain them to go through arbitration without hesitancy,
and to perform the award even though they may disagree with
it. In fact, it has come to be rather widely the practice in
American industry to proceed to arbitrational hearing on the
assumption that the issue between the parties has been joined
on the basis of the statement of grievance by the union and the
refusal of the company to allow the same or to compromise it.'1
It must be recognized that in many instances these things fur-
nish a sufficiently definite issue, so that evidence can be taken
in respect to it and ultimately an award made and performed.
Many employers who join in this practice, however, have sought
to protect themselves from any extreme action by an arbitrator
by stipulating in the contract that no arbitrator considering a
grievance shall have authority to add to, detract from, or other-
wise change the agreement negotiated and executed by the
parties.16 On the other hand, a considerable number of employ-
ers regularly insist upon a formal submission agreement, even
where the annual contract with the union provides for arbitra-
tion as the regular, final step in grievance procedure. Their
theory appears to be that by bargaining concerning the submis-
sion agreement in detail, they can be sure of the greatest ex-
treme of possible action by the arbitrator. They contend also
that, in at least some instances, the process of formally and
carefully reducing the dispute to writing will lead the parties
toward an amicable solution of the question and hence eliminate
the need for arbitration.
At this point, emphasis should be given to the distinction be-
tween the two great classes of labor disputes likely to proceed
to arbitration. They are, on the one hand, the more numerous
class of grievances or routine disputes arising under existing
labor agreements and, on the other hand, disputes which arise
in the process of negotiating a new contract. In the latter type
15. See Numerous examples in various Labor Law Service Arbitration
Reports, e. g., Commerce Clearing House, Bureau of Nat'l Affairs, and
Prentice-Hall.
16. See Collective Bargaining Contracts, (B. N. A. 1941) 114 and Union
Agreement Provisions, U. S. Dept. of Agriculture, B. L. S. Bull. No. 686(1942) p. 154.
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol1949/iss1/3
60 WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY LAW QUARTERLY
case, it is certainly evident that a carefully drawn submission
agreement should always be bargained and executed before the
arbitrational hearing. Unless the parties define with careful and
proper restrictions what the arbitrator shall have authority to
do in relation to the new contract, he may, under broad and
general provisions, reach extremes in his award which quite
conceivably might shock or outrage one or both of them.
It seems worthy to mention that an important intermediate
class of case is that including the discharge questions. Legally,
the principal restrictions upon discharges are found in the
statutes prohibiting terminations because of union activities or
membership. In collective agreements employers often under-
take that they will discharge or otherwise discipline only for
"good and just cause." In such cases, the arbitrator is sometimes
confronted with the difficulty of deciding whether the punish-
ment imposed was "just" or improperly extreme for a given
type of offense.17 He will be, of course, troubled with all of the
perplexities which always attend an effort to measure the in-
commensurable, but it is clearly his duty to decide in such in-
stances whether the punishment has been so severe as to be
unjust for the type of offense involved. Obviously, he will also
be required at times to judge whether the evidence adequately
supported the employer's conclusion of the guilt of the employee.
These cases are often complicated by a claim that the breach
of rules by the employee was not the reason but only a pretext
for a discharge for union activity. The arbitrator is bound to
weigh such evidence with care and even will be required at times
to compare its details with many other disciplinary actions by
the employer.18
17. E. g. the John Deere Waterloo Tractor Works current contract with
U.A.W.-C.I.O. Local 838 provides, in Art. IV, Sec. 1, "The Company shall
not exercise its right to discipline by reprimand, suspension, or discharge,
any employee except for good and just cause."
The General Motors agreement with the U. E. R. and M. W. A.-C. I. 0.
Locals provides in Sections 43 and 43a for union notification before any
disciplined employee shall be "required to leave the plant" and very sig-
nificantly states in Section 28g, "The Corporation delegates to the Umpire
full discretion in cases of violation of shop rules. In cases of violation
of the Strikes, Stoppages and Lockouts Section of the Agreement, the
Umpire shall have no power to order back pay if he shall find the employee
guilty of any of the conduct for which he was disciplined ......
18. See Labor-Management Relations Act (1947) 61 Stat. 146, c. 120,
(1948 Supp.) 29 U. S. C. A. §160c which provides against any reinstate-
ment by the N. L. R. B., if the "individual was suspended or discharged
for cause."
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IV. PROCEDURE
In a court proceeding, the parties are brought in by original
notice or summons and arrive at their issues through technical
but well-developed processes of pleading. In arbitration the pro-
ceedings are ordinarily initiated by the demand made upon the
employer by or on behalf of the employees. The issue will be
formed, if the subject is one of original negotiation, by the de-
mands of the union, the refusals of the company, and ultimately
the submission agreement will embody an effort to state the
question in dispute with exactness. If the dispute arises under
contractual grievance procedure, the employee or union will
make the demand in "the first step" of the foreman, the foreman
will reply to the same, and gradually step by step the dispute
will move upward in the rank of union and company officials
dealing with the same, until in the fourth or fifth step it passes
beyond all such officers and is submitted to arbitration. The is-
sues in such instances are often brought out very clearly and
satisfactorily by the minutes of the several "steps" of the griev-
ance procedure. Here, much depends upon the grievance provi-
sions of the contract between the parties and their practice un-
der it.
The grievance procedure should specify that unless the de-
mand made in the first step is granted by the foreman, it must
be reduced to writing and taken to the next step within a very
short specified period of one to three days. Indeed, it would be
better to require that each grievance be written and presented
in that form in the first step. It is to be noticed that some parties
who have carefully contracted for full and logical procedures
have settled for much less in actual practical administration. In
one set of forms which I know well, the union instructed its
stewards in a printed note to "Set forth the reason for the appeal
in detail." For months it has been the invariable practice of the
stewards to write as the "reason" only the words, "Reply of
company unsatisfactory."
In conclusion upon this point, it will suffice to say that the
grievance procedure records, if fully and faithfully kept, can be
extremely helpful to the parties in relation to disputes in sub-
sequent years when references are made to them as precedents.
Such correctly kept records can also be of great value in arbi-
trational proceedings. I cannot too strongly recommend that
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol1949/iss1/3
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carefully made written records of all grievance matters be main-
tained and preserved from the earliest possible step until such
time as there is no likelihood of the subject coming up again as
a precedent or a factor relating to an employee's or plant's
record.
The rules which obtained in common law pleading against
the "departure" and the "variance," apply in a certain logical
sense in arbitrational matters. Certainly if relief is requested
on one theory and the evidence established that the relief origi-
nally demanded is not deserved, but that some other form of
remedy should be allowed, the latter may possibly be subject to
an award depending upon the breadth of the submission agree-
ment. However, it is not to be assumed that a party should
receive some form of relief, when in an effort to attain one
remedy he has been proven not entitled to it, but possibly en-
titled to something else which under the submission the arbitra-
tor has no authority to order.
In general, the burden of proof falls upon the party whose
duty it is to establish the affirmative of the essential issue raised
in the dispute.19 In most instances, this means that the union
being the moving party should proceed with its evidence and
establish, if it can, the right to relief. In a considerable number
of recent discharge cases, arbitrators have ruled that the burden
of proof was upon the employer. This conclusion proceeds upon
the theory that the employee enjoyed an established legal status
up to the time when the employer took action and that it is,
therefore, up to the employer to justify the move made. This
is consistent with the theory that even the "striking employee"
is still an employee and not one who has "quit." 20 In other
words, once the fact is established that the relationship of em-
ployer and employee having seniority rights exists, it is assumed
that the same shall continue until it has been severed by legally
sound action based upon the provable right or privilege of the
acting party; that is, the employer.2'
19. Wigmore, Evdenwe (3d ed. 1940) 266-286, §§2483-2489.
20. Labor-Management Relations Act (1947) 61 Stat 137, c. 120, §2(3),(1948 Supp.) 29 U. S. C. A. §152(3).
21. See In re Bethlehem Steel Company and United Steelworkers of
America, Local No. 2499 (IO), 2 LA 194 (1945); In re Watt Car and
Wheel Company and International Molders and Foundry Workers Union,
Local 143 (AFL), 4 LA 67 (1946); In re American Liberty Oil Company
and Oil Workers International Union, Local 471 (CIO), 5 LA 399 (1946) ;
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This view reverses what was the common assumption a few
years ago that when the union asked for reinstatement of an
employee, it was asking for a change in the status quo and was,
therefore, to bear the burden of proving that the employee was
entitled to return to his employment. It is obvious that this
subject is of much more than moot importance. In any case of
uncertainty, the decision should be against the one which had
the burden of proof and failed successfully to carry it. Thus,
if the employer has agreed it will punish by discharge only for
just cause, the employer should be required to establish by evi-
dence the relative justice of the extreme penalty of discharge.
The burden will not be upon the employee to establish that the
discharge was unjustly severe for the offense committed.
On the other hand, there remain a great number of situations
in which the union as the moving party must bear the burden of
proof. In such instances, when the evidence does not point to
a clear conclusion, or if it leaves the mind of the arbitrator in
balance as between the contentions of the parties, the decision
should go against the union and in favor of the employer.22
Occasionally, the correct allocation of the burden of proof
becomes important where in effect the attitude of one side is
simply to "demur to the evidence" of the opponent. For exam-
ple, the employer has discharged a certain brick wheeler for
placing bats in a car of good brick in violation of working rules.
It attempts to support the discharge by showing that a foreman
entered the car and found broken or defective brick at a point
where he thought the discharged employee was unloading. If
the burden of proof is upon the employer, it must go to consider-
able length in establishing that the foreman did positively iden-
tify the defective bats as having been improperly placed in the
car by the man or men discharged. In such a case if the com-
pany fails to present the evidence required, the union should
win, even though it presents not a single witness or denial of
the charge against the person who was terminated.
V. EVIDENCE - KIND AND QUALITY
It may be generalized that in an arbitrational hearing all of
the various kinds of evidence receivable in court may be pre-
In re Aviation Maintenance Corporation and International Association of
Machinists, Aeronautical Industrial District Lodge 727, 8 LA 261 (1947).
22. 9 Wigmore, op. cit. supra note 19, at 278, 300, §§2487, 2495.
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sented and in addition to these any information of any kind
should be received which might tend to persuade the intelligent
business man dealing with the problem concerning his proper
course of action.23 Sometimes both parties rely entirely on hear-
say. Sometimes they rely upon a mutual assumption of facts
or evidence which one party or both will explain to the arbi-
trator on the basis of second or third-hand information. In such
instances, of course, if a controversy arises, the arbitrator must
require the parties to produce and offer evidence which will sup-
port a well-reasoned conclusion.
It happens with some frequency that one party or the other
may attempt to establish by oral evidence that though the parties
have a written contract, it was agreed or understood prior to the
signing of the formal writing that some of its provisions should
be only partially effective or be treated as mere empty, formal
statements. In such instances, the well-informed arbitrator must
rely upon the parol evidence rule,2' and advise the parties that
it is legally presumed that people do not write and subscribe to
undertakings that have no reality. In other words, though a
provision in a written document may be subsequently rescinded
by the parties or waived by a party or by both of them or nulli-
fied by one of them being estopped to make his claim under the
same, it is improper in the eyes of the law to allow proof that
an unambiguous, clear undertaking in writing was by reason
of prior oral agreement intended to have no reality at the time
it was made a part of a written agreement. The parol evidence
xule excludes any such conclusion. It has been the practice of
the undersigned to accept evidence in violation of the parol evi-
dence rule when it is urgently offered, however, and to examine
the record in full to ascertain whether the theory of the party
seeking to nullify part of the contract in fact will support a
rescission, a waiver or an estoppel occurring subsequently to the
execution of the formal agreement.
Writings of various kinds are regularly offered in evidence.
Some of these come in as recorded past recollection of the wit-
ness. Some of them come in to corroborate the claim of the wit-
ness that his present recollection has been revived. Sometimes
a written document comes in without direct testimony to sup-
23. Updegraff and McCoy, op. cit. supra note 5, at 100-103.
24. 9 Wigmore, op. cit. supra note 19, at 75, 149, §§2425, 2446.
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port it, but is taken by the arbitrator as having some probative
value since it appears to have been a record regularly kept and
to have emerged from the records of the company in circum-
stances which tend to indicate its accuracy.25
The late and very learned Dean Wigmore coined a technical
phrase for another type of evidence frequently tendered to the
arbitrator. It was "autoptic proference," that is, "real evi-
dence." 28 With considerable frequency, arbitrators are requested
to go from the place of hearing into a plant to view a manu-
facturing area or operation, to see a poorly ventilated, poorly
lighted, or dangerous working place or to view a machine. In
all such instances, the arbitrator should resolve every doubt in
favor of going to the place requested and observing the same.
In doing so, however, he should be accompanied by 'a limited
number of representatives of both sides. He should then give
the parties equal opportunities to explain to him the significance
of the matters presented for him to view, to hear, or otherwise
take into evidence.
These incidents are particularly likely to arise in relation to
time studies, machine operations, and manufacturing steps. If
the arbitrator does not fully understand the operations called
to his attention, he should ask questions and study them until
he is fully confident of his complete understanding of the con-
troverted matter, or he should recommend to the parties that
they call in an industrial engineer to view it, study it and testify
about it before the arbitrator at a later hearing.27 Nothing can
more clearly discountenance an arbitrator, and bring arbitra-
tion as a whole into disrepute, than a transparent, blundering
effort to decide a matter of technical import which the arbitrator
patently did not understand.
Cross-examination of witnesses must be the subject of some
comment. It should be remembered at all times that failure to
cross-examine does not by implication admit the verity of the
testimony given by the witness. I state this apparently obvious
fact because one otherwise well-informed man who frequently
appeared before me during the war gave as his reason for ap-
25. 5 Wigmore, op. cit. supra note 19, at 347-394, §§1517-1533.
26. 4 Wigmore, op. cit. supra note 19, at 237-243, §§1150-1152.
27. Consider here Louden, Wage Incentives (1944) 1-6, 82-93; Barnes,
Motion and Time Study 1-22; Cooke and Murray, Organized Labor and
Production (1946), c. 1.
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parently aimless, time-consuming cross-examination the belief
that unless he cross-examined he would be thought to have ad-
mitted the truth of the hostile witness' statements. When as-
sured he was wrong in this belief, he desisted from his former
tedious practice and saved much of his own time and that of
others.
Parties contemplating cross-examination should always re-
member that the questioning of a hostile witness often gives him
an opportunity to repeat, sometimes with increasing clarity and
emphasis, the damaging testimony he came there to give.28 In
many instances well-advised counsel will say, "No cross-exami-
nation." One expert in the field of evidence said, "My best advice
to the young attorney on the subject of cross-examination is,
'Don't.'" Another commentator stated, "There are but two situ-
ations in which one should cross-examine. They are (1) where
he is certain of the answer he is going to get, and (2) where
he doesn't care." Obviously, counsel usually should "care" that
hostile testimony be not repeatedly asserted with emphasis
against the interests of the party he is there to represent.
The writer of an excellent handbook on labor arbitrations
which recently appeared has, after many years of experience,
reached some interesting, self-taught conclusions about cross-
examination.2 9 He asserts that unless two conditions clearly
exist no cross-examination should be undertaken. These are
first, the examiner should be absolutely sure the witness will
tell the truth; and second, he should be sure of the answer he
will receive. In the absence of these two concurring factors,
that author advised that all cross-examination be waived.
After the evidence has all been presented at the hearing, the
parties should be given reasonable opportunities to present oral
arguments or to "sum up." This does not mean "altercation."
The arbitrator should see that the spokesman of the side having
the burden of proof is given a full and uninterrupted opportunity
to summarize its evidence and arguments if he wishes to do so.
It should then be required that the opposition have an equal
opportunity, likewise without interruptions.
The concept of a "fair hearing" seems to entitle the parties to
28. See Weiss, How To Try A Case (1930) 73 et seq.; Welman, The
Art of Cross Examination, c. 2; Cornelius, Cross Examination of Wit-
nesses (1929) 1-41.
29. Torrence, Tested Techniques In Labor Arbitration (1948) 130, 143.
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file written briefs and reply briefs if they request the opportu-
nity to do so. It is the practice of the undersigned to grant to
the parties either a mutually agreed time, or in cases of dispute,
ten days to two weeks for the filing of briefs following the re-
ceipt of transcript where one is made or following the hearing
if no transcript is provided. In some instances the parties are
given a brief additional period for the purpose of furnishing
reply briefs, if they have agreed upon such privilege. If there is
a difference of opinion upon these matters, practical suggestions
usually will help the parties to reach an understanding acceptable
to both.
VI. THE ARBITRATOR AND THE JUDGE
To a much greater extent than is the case with a trial judge,
the arbitrator is dependent upon himself, his own good sense and
tact, in making a hearing succesful and satisfactory. Whereas
the judge may rely upon the formality of the official court room
and the usual public respect and awe for the judiciary, the
arbitrator may hold his hearing in a conference room, a hotel
room, an office, or a work room. Whereas the order of the court
is obviously guarded and to be maintained by a bailiff or other
officer, the arbitrator in case of disorder must depend upon him-
self and the finality of his rulings, as well as his manner of
stating them to maintain decorum and assure proper progress
of the hearing.
These requirements mean that the arbitrator must couple dig-
nity with informality and keep the parties assured of his intelli-
gence, impartiality, and integrity. In the end, his award must
rest upon reason and will not have the authoritarian prestige
which will maintain the decree of the judge. Without doubt it is
true that most judges could be, if necessary, successful umpires
or arbitrators. Those who have succeeded, however, at the more
informal type of procedure involved in arbitration report they
have often found it necessary to adopt different attitudes and
methods of approach and different tones in respect to rulings
than are entirely acceptable, logical and suitable in the more
formal atmosphere of the court room.
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VII. CONCLUSIONS
Detailed statistics upon the point are lacking, but I believe it
is correct to say there has been a great expansion of the scope
and number of instances of labor arbitration in recent years.31
Much of such impetus was, no doubt, received during the War
Labor Board days in connection with which it must be recalled
that such Board and its subdivisions constituted a temporary
nation-wide, semi-official arbitrational system. It has been pro-
posed from time to time that arbitration of labor disputes should
be made compulsory. I do not agree with this. If labor arbitra-
tion were to be made compulsory, then the rights of the parties
in arbitration would have to be predetermined by numerous rules,
principles, standards and conceptions, most of which must of
necessity originate in statutes. Upon this subject, I am sure
capital and labor agree. They do not want to be strait-jacketed
by legislative action, but prefer the possibly less scientific but
more natural course of growth summed up in the "trial and
error" method or otherwise designated the "American method of
free competition."
There is no magic by which any party can be assured that
arbitration will inevitably lead to the most sensible and just
result. If the arbitrator has been carefully selected and is worthy
of his job, and if the contentions of the parties are well pre-
sented, an intelligent, just and workable award should follow.
Without doubt, high-skilled, painstaking preparation will give
any party a greater likelihood of winning an arbitration than
will hasty half-measures. But it cannot be confidently stated
that the most careful and skilled representative after the most
thorough and complete preparation will always win, even where
justly entitled to do so. When all is said and done, arbitration
is at most but a helpful and useful procedure for the solution of
labor disputes. It is not a panacea. With all its dependence upon
human frailties, however, it is infinitely a better way than the
economic pressure methods of strikes and lockouts of deciding
labor disputes.
30. See Labor Arbitration Under State Statutes (U. S. Dept. of Labor
1943); Flock, Methods Adopted By States For Settlement Of Labor Dis-
putes (1949) 34 Iowa L. Rev. 430; Kellor, American Arbitration (1948)
c. 11; and Updegraff and McCoy, op. cit. supra note 5, at 8-9.
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